

Differential Rewards in a Context of Low Expectations: Gendered  
Evaluations of Policy Implementation in Argentina  
Online Appendix

**Contents**

<b>A. Study Details</b>	<b>2</b>
Full vignette text with all treatments . . . . .	2
Sample characteristics . . . . .	2
<b>B. Results Tables</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>C. Additional analyses</b>	<b>3</b>

## A. Study Details

### Full vignette text with all treatments

Our survey vignettes contained three experimental manipulations in the text: (1) the gender of the mayor (male or female); (2) the political party of the mayor (Peronista, PRO, omitted); and (3) the quality of the distribution of the program (unbiased, biased, omitted). In addition, the vignette was accompanied by an image of a box of food for which we manipulated (4) the presence of the mayor’s name on the box (name, no name).

The text of the vignette in Spanish was:

Imagine un/a intendenta/a Peronista/del PRO/[omit] que se presenta a la reelección este año. Durante su gestión, el/la intendente/a implementó un programa de ayuda a los pobres que consiste en la distribución de cajas de alimentos, como la que se muestra en la foto. Los beneficiarios del programa son seleccionados estrictamente según el nivel de necesidad/Los beneficiarios del programa son teóricamente seleccionados según el nivel de necesidad. En la práctica, los que tienen contactos en la municipalidad reciben prioridad/[omit].

The English translation is:

Imagine a Peronist / PRO/ [omit] Mayor who is running for reelection this year. During her/his time in office, the Mayor implemented a program to help poor people, which consists of the distribution of boxes of food, as shown in the picture. Program beneficiaries are strictly selected based on need / Program beneficiaries theoretically selected based on need. In practice, those with contacts inside the municipality receive priority /[omit].

### Sample characteristics

**Table A1: Sample characteristics**

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Age	1802	39.90	16.00	16	87
Female (0/1)	1802	0.55	0.50	0	1
Poor (Social Class = D1, D2, or E) (0/1)	1802	0.43	0.49	0	1
From the city or province of Buenos Aires (0/1)	1802	0.43	0.50	0	1
Household head education (scale)	1802	6.40	2.00	1	10

## B. Results Tables

This section presents tables with numerical results from the main document.

- Table B1 reproduces Figure 1 in the main text
- Table B2 reproduces Figure 2 in the main text
- Table B3 reproduces Figure 3 in the main text

**Table B1: Means by treatment condition and differences in means for electoral performance outcomes**

Mayor	Biased	No info	Unbiased	Biased - No info	Unbiased - No info	Unbiased - Biased
<b>If you lived in this municipality, how likely would you be to vote for the mayor in the next election?</b>						
Male mayor	1.80 (0.89) [0.00]	1.93 (0.94) [0.00]	2.14 (0.98) [0.00]	-0.12 (0.07) [0.08]	0.21 (0.07) [0.00]	0.34 (0.07) [0.00]
Female mayor	1.91 (0.97) [0.00]	1.95 (0.94) [0.00]	2.01 (0.94) [0.00]	-0.04 (0.08) [0.58]	0.06 (0.07) [0.45]	0.10 (0.07) [0.19]
Difference	-0.11 (0.07) [0.14]	-0.03 (0.07) [0.73]	0.13 (0.07) [0.07]	-0.08 (0.10) [0.43]	0.16 (0.10) [0.12]	0.24 (0.10) [0.02]
<b>In your opinion, how likely it is that this program will help the mayor win reelection?</b>						
Male mayor	3.08 (0.85) [0.00]	2.97 (0.83) [0.00]	3.04 (0.82) [0.00]	0.11 (0.06) [0.08]	0.07 (0.06) [0.23]	-0.04 (0.06) [0.56]
Female mayor	3.04 (0.86) [0.00]	3.00 (0.87) [0.00]	3.06 (0.83) [0.00]	0.04 (0.07) [0.55]	0.07 (0.07) [0.32]	0.02 (0.07) [0.71]
Difference	0.04 (0.07) [0.53]	-0.03 (0.07) [0.66]	-0.02 (0.06) [0.76]	0.07 (0.09) [0.45]	0.01 (0.09) [0.92]	-0.06 (0.09) [0.50]

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets.

**Table B2: Perceptions of corruption, patronage, and vote buying by mayor gender in the control group**

Outcome	Male mayor	Female mayor	Diff-in-means	p-value	$\chi^2$	df	p-value
Mayor was corrupt	3.37	3.28	-0.09	0.15	3.91	3	0.27
Mayor offered patronage	3.39	3.40	0.01	0.85	2.92	3	0.40
Mayor buys votes	3.37	3.29	-0.09	0.17	1.89	3	0.60

**Table B3: Means by treatment condition and differences in means for program satisfaction outcomes**

Mayor	Biased	No info	Unbiased	Biased - No info	Unbiased - No info	Unbiased - Biased
<b>How likely is it that the box of food is distributed to those who really need it?</b>						
Male mayor	1.94 (0.99) [0.00]	2.07 (1.01) [0.00]	2.34 (1.06) [0.00]	-0.13 (0.08) [0.09]	0.27 (0.08) [0.00]	0.40 (0.08) [0.00]
Female mayor	2.00 (0.97) [0.00]	2.15 (1.04) [0.00]	2.28 (1.03) [0.00]	-0.14 (0.08) [0.07]	0.13 (0.08) [0.11]	0.27 (0.08) [0.00]
Difference	-0.06 (0.08) [0.44]	-0.07 (0.08) [0.35]	0.07 (0.08) [0.39]	0.01 (0.11) [0.89]	0.14 (0.11) [0.21]	0.13 (0.11) [0.25]
<b>How likely is it that you would be satisfied with the program if it was implemented in your municipality?</b>						
Male mayor	2.04 (0.81) [0.00]	2.14 (0.85) [0.00]	2.18 (0.89) [0.00]	-0.09 (0.06) [0.14]	0.04 (0.07) [0.54]	0.13 (0.07) [0.04]
Female mayor	2.03 (0.88) [0.00]	2.15 (0.86) [0.00]	2.14 (0.91) [0.00]	-0.11 (0.07) [0.10]	-0.01 (0.07) [0.93]	0.11 (0.07) [0.12]
Difference	0.01 (0.07) [0.92]	-0.01 (0.07) [0.84]	0.03 (0.07) [0.63]	0.02 (0.09) [0.83]	0.05 (0.10) [0.63]	0.03 (0.10) [0.78]

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets.

## C. Additional analyses

- Table C1 checks for balance across experimental conditions using multinomial logit
- Table C2 shows means and differences in means by treatment condition and respondent gender for

electoral performance outcomes. We find no evidence of stronger differential punishment/rewards among female respondents

- Table C3 shows means by treatment condition and differences in means for perceptions of the mayor’s record with corruption, patronage, and vote buying. We find no evidence of differential rewards for beliefs on whether the respondent thinks the mayor is likely to have engaged in corruption, patronage, or vote buying
- Table C4 shows the distribution of respondents’ recollection of mayor’s gender in the vignette. The table suggests that respondents recall the gender of female mayors more often
- Table C5 shows the effect of mayor gender and picture naming treatments on recalling mayor’s gender. This suggests that the main driver of recall is the change from mentioning a male mayor to a female mayor

**Table C1: Multinomial logit estimates of treatment combinations against observed respondent characteristics**

Mayor	Implementation	Term	Estimate	SE	p-value
Male	Biased	Intercept	-0.18	0.38	0.64
Male	Biased	Age	-0.01	0.00	0.08
Male	Biased	Education	0.09	0.04	0.03
Male	Biased	Poor	0.00	0.18	0.98
Male	Biased	Sex = Male	-0.19	0.15	0.22
Male	Unbiased	Intercept	-0.60	0.38	0.11
Male	Unbiased	Age	0.00	0.00	0.42
Male	Unbiased	Education	0.11	0.04	0.01
Male	Unbiased	Poor	0.21	0.18	0.23
Male	Unbiased	Sex = Male	-0.07	0.15	0.65
Female	No info	Intercept	-0.37	0.38	0.33
Female	No info	Age	0.00	0.00	0.36
Female	No info	Education	0.09	0.04	0.04
Female	No info	Poor	0.06	0.18	0.75
Female	No info	Sex = Male	-0.22	0.16	0.15
Female	Biased	Intercept	-0.34	0.38	0.37
Female	Biased	Age	0.00	0.00	0.68
Female	Biased	Education	0.06	0.04	0.15
Female	Biased	Poor	0.07	0.18	0.72
Female	Biased	Sex = Male	-0.20	0.16	0.20
Female	Unbiased	Intercept	-0.58	0.38	0.13
Female	Unbiased	Age	0.00	0.00	0.50
Female	Unbiased	Education	0.06	0.04	0.17
Female	Unbiased	Poor	0.15	0.18	0.42
Female	Unbiased	Sex = Male	-0.04	0.15	0.81

*Note:* Baseline category is a vignette with a male mayor and no information on implementation.

**Table C2: Means and differences in means by treatment condition and respondent gender for electoral performance outcomes**

Respondent	Mayor	Biased	No info	Unbiased	Biased - No info	Unbiased - No info	Unbiased - Biased
<b>If you lived in this municipality, how likely would you be to vote for the mayor in the next election?</b>							
Female respondent	Male mayor	3.08 (0.84) [0.00]	2.97 (0.79) [0.00]	3.01 (0.85) [0.00]	0.11 (0.09) [0.19]	0.04 (0.09) [0.65]	-0.07 (0.09) [0.40]
Female respondent	Female mayor	3.13 (0.86) [0.00]	2.95 (0.84) [0.00]	3.07 (0.84) [0.00]	0.19 (0.09) [0.04]	0.13 (0.09) [0.15]	-0.06 (0.09) [0.51]
Female respondent	Difference	-0.05 (0.09) [0.58]	0.03 (0.09) [0.76]	-0.06 (0.09) [0.48]	-0.08 (0.12) [0.54]	-0.09 (0.12) [0.47]	-0.01 (0.13) [0.92]
Male respondent	Male mayor	3.07 (0.87) [0.00]	2.96 (0.87) [0.00]	3.08 (0.78) [0.00]	0.11 (0.10) [0.26]	0.11 (0.09) [0.21]	0.01 (0.09) [0.95]
Male respondent	Female mayor	2.91 (0.85) [0.00]	3.07 (0.90) [0.00]	3.05 (0.81) [0.00]	-0.15 (0.11) [0.15]	-0.02 (0.10) [0.88]	0.14 (0.10) [0.16]
Male respondent	Difference	0.16 (0.10) [0.11]	-0.10 (0.10) [0.32]	0.03 (0.09) [0.74]	0.26 (0.14) [0.07]	0.13 (0.13) [0.33]	-0.13 (0.13) [0.33]
<b>In your opinion, how likely it is that this program will help the mayor win reelection?</b>							
Female respondent	Male mayor	1.79 (0.85) [0.00]	1.88 (0.89) [0.00]	2.12 (0.90) [0.00]	-0.09 (0.09) [0.31]	0.24 (0.09) [0.01]	0.33 (0.09) [0.00]
Female respondent	Female mayor	1.93 (0.92) [0.00]	1.97 (0.94) [0.00]	2.05 (0.90) [0.00]	-0.05 (0.10) [0.64]	0.08 (0.10) [0.42]	0.12 (0.10) [0.20]
Female respondent	Difference	-0.14 (0.09) [0.14]	-0.09 (0.10) [0.34]	0.07 (0.09) [0.45]	-0.05 (0.13) [0.73]	0.16 (0.13) [0.23]	0.21 (0.13) [0.11]
Male respondent	Male mayor	1.82 (0.94) [0.00]	1.97 (0.98) [0.00]	2.16 (1.08) [0.00]	-0.15 (0.11) [0.16]	0.19 (0.11) [0.10]	0.34 (0.11) [0.00]
Male respondent	Female mayor	1.88 (1.04) [0.00]	1.92 (0.94) [0.00]	1.96 (0.98) [0.00]	-0.04 (0.12) [0.76]	0.04 (0.11) [0.75]	0.07 (0.12) [0.54]
Male respondent	Difference	-0.07 (0.12) [0.57]	0.05 (0.11) [0.65]	0.20 (0.11) [0.08]	-0.12 (0.16) [0.47]	0.15 (0.16) [0.34]	0.27 (0.16) [0.10]

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets.

**Table C3: Means by treatment condition and differences in means for perceptions of the mayor’s record with corruption, patronage, and vote buying**

Mayor	Biased	No info	Unbiased	Biased - No info	Unbiased - No info	Unbiased - Biased
<b>How likely is it that the mayor has been involved in corruption in the past?</b>						
Male mayor	3.38 (0.82) [0.00]	3.37 (0.80) [0.00]	3.36 (0.80) [0.00]	0.00 (0.06) [0.96]	-0.01 (0.06) [0.81]	-0.02 (0.06) [0.78]
Female mayor	3.32 (0.72) [0.00]	3.28 (0.80) [0.00]	3.21 (0.81) [0.00]	0.04 (0.06) [0.51]	-0.07 (0.06) [0.24]	-0.12 (0.06) [0.06]
Difference	0.05 (0.06) [0.40]	0.09 (0.06) [0.15]	0.15 (0.06) [0.02]	-0.04 (0.09) [0.66]	0.06 (0.09) [0.49]	0.10 (0.09) [0.26]
<b>How likely is it that the mayor has given public employment in the city to a friend or family member?</b>						
Male mayor	3.41 (0.97) [0.00]	3.39 (1.00) [0.00]	3.34 (0.98) [0.00]	0.03 (0.08) [0.73]	-0.05 (0.08) [0.54]	-0.07 (0.08) [0.33]
Female mayor	3.36 (1.00) [0.00]	3.40 (0.96) [0.00]	3.37 (1.00) [0.00]	-0.04 (0.08) [0.62]	-0.03 (0.08) [0.72]	0.01 (0.08) [0.88]
Difference	0.05 (0.08) [0.51]	-0.01 (0.08) [0.85]	-0.03 (0.08) [0.66]	0.07 (0.11) [0.55]	-0.02 (0.11) [0.86]	-0.08 (0.11) [0.44]
<b>How likely is it that the mayor, to win reelection, will purchase votes?</b>						
Male mayor	3.37 (0.83) [0.00]	3.37 (0.81) [0.00]	3.28 (0.88) [0.00]	-0.01 (0.06) [0.91]	-0.09 (0.06) [0.14]	-0.09 (0.07) [0.18]
Female mayor	3.37 (0.81) [0.00]	3.29 (0.86) [0.00]	3.28 (0.84) [0.00]	0.08 (0.07) [0.21]	-0.01 (0.07) [0.89]	-0.09 (0.07) [0.16]
Difference	-0.00 (0.06) [0.98]	0.09 (0.06) [0.17]	0.00 (0.07) [0.97]	-0.09 (0.09) [0.32]	-0.09 (0.09) [0.35]	0.00 (0.09) [0.96]

*Note:* Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets.

**Table C4: Distribution of respondent’s recollection of mayor’s gender in vignette**

Recollection	N	Proportion
<b>Female mayor (N = 963)</b>		
Male	39	0.04
Female	873	0.91
This information was not provided	23	0.02
I do not know	28	0.03
<b>Male mayor (N = 1027)</b>		
Male	528	0.51
Female	14	0.01
This information was not provided	397	0.39
I do not know	88	0.09

Table C4 shows estimates for the effect of the mayor gender and naming treatments on whether the respondent recalls the gender of the mayor correctly. The figure suggests that including the name for the picture increases recall for male mayor vignettes slightly. However, the largest increase in recall rates comes from changing the hypothetical mayor from a man to a woman, and the recall rate for vignettes with a name label ( $0.45 + 0.46 + 0.13 - 0.13$ ) and without it ( $0.45 + 0.46$ ).

**Table C5: Effect of mayor gender and picture naming treatments on recalling mayor's gender**

Term	Outcome: Correct recall of gender (0/1)		
	Estimate	SE	p-value
Intercept (Male mayor-Not labeled)	0.45	0.02	0.00
Female mayor	0.46	0.03	0.00
Labeled	0.13	0.03	0.00
Interaction	-0.13	0.04	0.00

*Note:* OLS regression estimates with HC1 robust standard errors.